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Case Comment
International Law and Human Rights-Alien Tort
Claims Under 28 U.S.C. § 1350: Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala
On March 29, 1976, in Asuncion, Paraguay, local police kid-
napped and tortured to death Joelito Filartiga.1 One of the al-
leged torturers was Americo Norberto Pena-Irala (Pena),
Inspector General of Police in Asuncion.2 Pena subsequently
entered the United States on a temporary visa and moved to
New York City. In 1979, Dolly Filartiga, a sister of Joelito Filar-
tiga living in the United States, learned of Pena's presence in
this country.3 She notified the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS), which began deportation proceedings against
Pena. While Pena was in INS custody, Dolly Filartiga served
him with a civil complaint in federal district court, demanding
"damages for violation of human rights for the wrongful torture
and murder of the decedent Joelito Filartiga."4 The district
court issued a stay of deportation5 to secure Pena's testimony
for trial, but subsequently dismissed the suit for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. 6 The stay of deportation was lifted,7 and
Pena returned to Paraguay.8 The Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals reversed the district court's ruling, holding that there was
subject matter jurisdiction under section 1350 of the Alien Tort
Statute9 on the grounds that "deliberate torture perpetrated
1. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980). Joelita Filartiga
was the seventeen year-old son of Dr. Joel Filartiga, a physician practicing
medicine among the poor living outside of Asuncion. Dr. Filartiga has been a
long-standing critic of the Stroessner regime.
2. Id.
3. Id. at 879. Dolly Filartiga was in the United States on a visitor's visa
and has since then applied for political asylum. Id. at 876.
4. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, No. 79 C 917, slip op. at 2 (E.D.N.Y. May 15,
1979). Dolly Filartiga and her father, Dr. Joel Filartiga, brought this suit;
5. 630 F.2d at 879.
6. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, No. 79 C 917, slip op. at 4 (E.D.N.Y. May 15,
1979).
7. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 442 U.S. 901 (1979) (denied application for
stay of deportation).
8. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980).
9. The Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1976), reads: "The district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
under color of official authority violates universally accepted
norms of the international law of human rights, regardless of
the nationality of the parties."'o Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630
F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
Congress enacted section 135011 as part of the Judiciary Act
of 1789 and narrowly limited its jurisdiction to "all causes
where an alien sues for a tort only"12 in violation of a treaty of
the United States or of international law. Generally, plaintiffs
only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States." The plaintiffs also claimed jurisdiction under the general federal ques-
tion statute: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil ac-
tions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28
U.S.C. § 1331 (1976) (amended 1980).
10. 630 F.2d at 878.
11. See note 9 supra.
12. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9(b), 1 Stat. 73 (1789). A long-standing
and venerable part of the federal judiciary code, the present version of the
Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1976), has survived relatively unchanged
since its first enactment in 1789. See id.; Act of Dec. 1, 1873, ch. 3, § 563, 18 Stat.
96 (1875); Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 2, § 24, 36 Stat. 1091 (1911); Act of June 25,
1948, ch. 85, § 1350, 62 Stat. 934 (1948). The purpose of section 1350 may have
been to centralize federal control over matters involving foreign relations and
international law. The need for a unified judicial approach in the area of for-
eign relations was recognized by the framers of the Constitution. Alexander
Hamilton wrote that "the federal judiciary ought to have cognizance of all
causes in which the citizens of other countries are concerned." THE FEDERAL-
IST No. 80, at 536 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). See also Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427 n.25 (1964); Dickinson, The Law of Nations
as Part of the National Law of the United States, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 26, 37
(1952). Section 1350 thus fills part of a gap in federal jurisdiction. Without a
special grant of jurisdiction over the subject matter, federal courts would be
unable to hear a suit involving only aliens as parties. See 13 C. WRIGHT, A.
MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3604 (1975); 14 id.
§ 3661 (1976).
It might be argued that Congress intended section 1350 to cover only torts
recognized in the law of nations, such as piracy and slave trading, that interna-
tional law defined and punished. See United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.)
153, 162 (1820). The first federal cases applying the predecessor of section 1350
involved instances of maritime commerce, supporting the contention that sec-
tion 1350 was implemented to establish uniform rules in areas of international
relations. The Second Circuit holding that torture violated international law,
see text accompanying notes 52-53 infra, is consistent with this view. The
choice of law issue presented by section 1350, whether international law or ap-
plicable state law defines the tort and available remedies, however, was not de-
cided by the Second Circuit.
A related question is whether state courts have concurrent jurisdiction
over a case where section 1350 is applicable. No courts applying section 1350
have held that state courts do not have jurisdiction; indeed, state courts have
long asserted jurisdiction over transitory tort claims involving aliens, subject
only to the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Eingartner v. Illinois Steel Co.,
94 Wis. 70, 76, 68 N.W. 664, 665 (1896). If a section 1350 claim were heard in a
state court, however, federal substantive law would govern. Cf. Banco Na-
cional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427 (1964) (intrinsically federal
problems created by act of state doctrine required determination according to
federal law).
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have easily satisfied the alien and tort only requirements.13
The requirement that the alleged tort violate a United States
treaty or international law, however, has been a threshold bar-
rier to several section 1350 claims.14 Because the alien and tort
only requirements were not in dispute in Filartiga, the central
issue presented to the Second Circuit was whether a right of
action existed under a United States treaty or a rule of interna-
tional law.
For a treaty violation to be actionable by an individual
under section 1350, the treaty must be part of domestic law, ei-
ther because Congress has acted specifically to make it part of
domestic law, or because the treaty is self-executing.B A self-
executing treaty confers justiciable rights upon citizens imme-
diately upon ratification by the United States.16 Courts ex-
amine the treaty's history, purpose, and provisions as a whole
to determine whether the treaty, by prescribing rules under
which private rights may be enforced, evidences an intent that
it be self-executing.' 7 One potential source of rights for liti-
13. No reported cases have been dismissed for failure to meet the alienage
requirement, and only one case has been dismissed for a failure to be brought
in tort only. Moxon v. The Brigatine Fanny, 17 F. Cas. 942 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793).
14. See, e.g., Huynh Thi Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d 625, 629 (6th Cir. 1978); Benja-
min v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913, 915 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1114 (1978).
15. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829). See Note, Self-Execut-
ing Treaties and the Human Rights Provisions of the United Nations Charter: A
Separation of Powers Problem, 25 BuFFALO L. REV. 773, 774-75 (1976); Note, In-
dividual Enforcement of Obligations Arising Under the United Nations Charter,
19 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 195, 196 (1979).
16. See, e.g., Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 598-99 (1884); Foster v. Neil-
son, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829). Although the essence of self-executing trea-
ties is the existence of specific provisions in the treaty conferring enforceable
rights, a private claim may still occasionally bear a relationship to general
treaty provisions such that the claim may be said to arise under it, as required
by the Constitution. U.S. CONsT. art. IM § 2, cL 2. See 13 C. WmGHT, A. MILER
& E. COOPER, supra note 12, § 3563, at 424 (1975).
17. One court has held that the treaty must expressly confer federal juris-
diction to allow assertion of a private claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976), as
amended by Act of Dec. 1, 1980, Pub. L. 96-486, § 2(a), 94 Stat. 2369. Smith v.
Canadian Pac. Airways, Ltd., 452 F.2d 798, 802 (2d Cir. 1971). It does not follow,
however, that the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1976), is similarly limited
when United States treaties are asserted as the basis of jurisdiction. The lan-
guage of section 1350, in predicating federal jurisdiction on either a violation of
a United States treaty or international law, makes no distinction between the
two sources of jurisdiction. Section 1350 is a limited means of hurdling the pro-
cedural disability individuals face in asserting rights under international law.
If under section 1350 United States treaties are given status equal to interna-
tional law as a basis for jurisdiction, an express provision in a United States
treaty giving individuals access to federal courts is not necessary. Moreover,
the opposite view, that United States treaties must expressly provide for sec-
tion 1350 jurisdiction, as in the case of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976),
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gants in a case like Filartiga is the United Nations Charter, a
treaty of the United States. 8 Some courts have found various
portions of the Charter to be self-executing,' 9 but the human
rights provisions of the Charter have been denied such status. 2o
A court may also sustain jurisdiction under section 1350 if
the alleged wrong violates international law or the law of na-
tions.2 ' A court can find a relevant rule of international law for
this purpose by referring to written international law, in which
a consensus of the world community agrees to be bound by
rules established in treaties.22 As in an action based on a
United States treaty, the plaintiff must prove that an interna-
tional treaty creates justiciable rights for private litigants, and
that the plaintiffs claim is sufficiently related to the treaty to
arise under it.
as amended by Act of Dec. 1, 1980, Pub. L. 96-486, § 2(a), 94 Stat. 2369, would
make part of the language of section 1350 superfluous.
18. 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993 (1945).
19. E.g., Balfour, Guthrie & Co. v. United States, 90 F. Supp. 831, 833 (N.D.
Cal. 1950) (Article 104); Curran v. City of New York, 191 Misc. 229, 234, 77
N.Y.S.2d 206, 212 (Sup. Ct. 1947) (Articles 104, 105), affd, 275 A.D. 784, 88
N.Y.S.2d 924 (App. Div. 1949).
20. E.g., Sei Fujii v. State, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952). In Sei Fujii
the plaintiff, a Japanese citizen, argued that a California statute forbidding him
to own land within the state violated his rights under the United Nations Char-
ter. Id. at 720, 242 P.2d at 619. An intermediate California appellate court ruled
that the law was invalid for violating United States obligations under the
human rights provisions of the Charter. Sei Fujii v. State, 217 P.2d 481, 488 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1950). The California Supreme Court affirmed the decision, but based
its holding on the fourteenth amendment. In dictum, the court explicitly re-
jected the appellate court's opinion that the Charter's human rights provisions
were self-executing, because they lacked mandatory language and were indefi-
nite. 38 Cal. 2d at 723-24, 242 P.2d at 622. Accord, Hitai v. Immigration & Natu-
ralization Serv., 343 F.2d 466, 468 (2d Cir. 1965). See Pauling v. McElroy, 164 F.
Supp. 390 (D.D.C. 1958) (trusteeship provisions of Charter not self-executing).
But cf. Hurd v. Hodge, 162 F.2d 233, 245 (D.C. Cir. 1947) (Edgerton, J., dissent-
ing) (United Nations Charter compels United States to eliminate racial dis-
crimination); Kenji Namba v. McCourt, 185 Ore. 579, 604, 204 P.2d 569, 579 (1949)
(human rights provisions of United Nations Charter impose obligations on
United States).
21. See note 9 supra.
22. Raman, Toward a General Theory of International Customary Law, in
TowARD WORLD ORDER AND HUmAN DiGNrrY 365, 365 (M. Reisman & B. Weston
eds. 1976). See also article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Jus-
tice, which provides that in resolving disputes the International Court of Jus-
tice shall apply.
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establish-
ing rules expressly recognized by contesting states;
b. international custom as evidence of a general practice accepted as
law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.
U.N. CHARTER, STAT. OF I.C.J. art. 38. See also H. LAUTERPACHr, International
Law, in I GENERAL WoRKs OF HERSCH LAUTERPACHT 56 (1970).
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Customary international law, which emerges when nations
conform their behavior in national or international affairs to
preferred values, 2 3 may also provide a basis for a section 1350
action. Over time, these preferred rules of conduct become
widespread practices, leading to a consensus among nations
that these practices are part of international law.24 Although
different in establishment, customary international law is equal
in status to written rules of international law. 25 The analytical
process for establishing the existence of a rule of customary in-
ternational law requires an examination of the circumstances
and practices forming the widely held belief that an expected
rule of conduct has force as international law.26 The approach
of the United States Supreme Court in The Paquete Habana2 7
is illustrative of the methodology used by courts to find a rule
of customary international law. In reaching the holding that
customary international law exempted coastal fishing vessels
from capture as prizes of war,28 the Court examined orders of
the King of England, scholarly writings on international law,
and agreements between nations.29
Most litigants, however, have not successfully proved a vio-
lation of international law in a section 1350 action.3 0 Part of the
difficulty in establishing a cause of action under section 1350
based on a violation of international law is the traditional opin-
ion that only states have rights under international law.31
Courts have viewed individuals only as objects of international
23. Raman, supra note 22, at 365, 369.
24. See id. at 369.
25. See U.N. CHARTER, STAT. OF LC.J. art. 38.
26. Raman, supra note 22, at 369.
27. 175 U.S. 677 (1900). In The Paquete Habana, the master of two Spanish
ships brought suit to recover the proceeds from the sale of two fishing vessels
seized as prizes of war off the coast of Cuba during the Spanish-American War.
Declaring the seizure a violation of international law, the Court held, "By an
ancient usage among civilized nations, beginning centuries ago, and gradually
ripening into a rule of international law, coast fishing vessels, pursuing their vo-
cation of catching and bringing in fresh fish, have been recognized as exempt,
with their cargoes and crews, from capture as prize of war." Id. at 686.
28. Id. at 686.
29. Id. at 686-708.
30. See, e.g., cases cited in note 14 supra. Only one modern case prior to
Filartiga based jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350
(1976), on a violation of international law. See Abduhl-Rahman Omar Adra v.
Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961). More recent decisions applying section
1350 have found that the alleged wrong did not violate international law. E.g.,
Huyhn Thi Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 1978); IT v. Vencap, 519 F.2d 1001
(2d Cir. 1975).
31. See H. LAUTERPACHT, I International Law, in THE COLLECTED WORKS
OF HERSCH LAUTERPACHT 136 (1970); L. OPPENHEIM, I INTERNATIONAL LAw § 13a,
at 19 (8th ed. 1955).
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law, generally without rights, especially against their own
states. 32 The historical development of international law as it
evolved to meet the problems of commerce and diplomatic in-
tercourse between nations shaped this perception.3 3 The con-
cept of sovereignty meant that rules governing individuals were
the sole province of the state, which could implement whatever
domestic law it wished.34
Although evolving standards came to provide individuals
with rights in some circumstances, 35 a profound change in the
status of individuals under international law occurred in the af-
termath of World War H. The Nuremburg trials of Nazi war
criminals established the precedent that the rights of citizens
had to be protected even in wartime. Individuals, not just
states, were held accountable for crimes against humanity.36
Furthermore, individuals could not claim protection by assert-
ing that local law or official duties compelled their acts.37
The involvement of the United Nations in the process of de-
veloping norms of international law for human rights originated
with the Charter. The countries forming the United Nations
pledged to observe human rights38 and to take separate and
32. H. LAuTERPACiT, supra note 31, at 295-96; L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 31,
§ 292, at 641.
33. See D. GRIEG, INTERNATIONAL LAw 2 (2d ed. 1976).
34. Id. at 594; L OPPENHEIM, supra note 31, at § 291. The concept of the pri-
macy of domestic law sometimes misleads United States courts into relegating
international law to a secondary status, although as part of the federal common
law it is equal in status to other federal common law rules. See, e.g., State v.
Marley, 54 Hawaii 450, 509 P.2d 1095 (1973); Note, The Human Rights Phenome-
non: An Example of International Law as Authoritative Consensus, 42 ALB. L.
REV. 663, 665 n.12 (1978).
35. Actions were taken in the late nineteenth century to protect the reli-
gious and political freedoms of certain minorities. See, e.g., Treaty of Berlin, in
L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw § 128, at 296 (8th ed. 1955). Rules of warfare,
also developed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, afforded
some protection to civilian populations. Id. at § 30. See also D. GRIEG, supra
note 33, at 799. The Permanent Court of International Justice ruled in the 1920s
that states' actions may give rise to individual rights in international law, not
by direct action, but by prescribing expected rules of conduct. Advisory Opin-
ion Concerning the Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig [1928] P.C.I.J., ser. B,
No. 15, noted in H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 31, at 142, 288-89; see FACHII, THE
PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 274-76 (2d ed. 1932).
36. H. LAUTERPACET, supra note 31, at 141, 148.
37. See id. at 470; Saario & Cass, The United Nations and the International
Protection of Human Rights: A Legal Analysis and Interpretation, 7 CAL. W.
INT'L L.J. 591, 593 nA (1977).
38. "[Wlith a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being
which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations... the
United Nations shall promote ... universal respect for, and observance of
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race,
sex, language or religion." U.N. CHARTER art. 55.
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collective action to achieve goals protecting human rights. 39
These goals gained more authoritative definition with the
United Nation's passage of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights,40 which established specific, fundamental freedoms for
individuals, including the right to be free from torture.4 1 The
subsequent endorsement of these early human rights princi-
ples by third world countries joining the United Nations
strengthened the development of the international law of
human rights42 by indicating that these principles are not
solely the product of Western nations with democratic tradi-
tions. This broad base of support is instrumental to the forma-
tion of the international consensus necessary to incorporate
human rights, such as the right to be free from torture, into in-
ternational law.43
In 1976, the United Nations issued the "Declaration on the
Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture"
(Declaration Against Torture),44 another important step in the
process of defining individual human rights under the Charter.
Elaborating on the right of individuals to be free from torture,
this declaration defined "torture" as the infliction of severe
pain on an individual by a public official as punishment or to
obtain information. 45 The Declaration Against Torture also re-
ferred to the United Nations Charter, stating that any act of tor-
ture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment contravenes the purpose of the Charter and vio-
39. "All members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in
cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set
forth in Article 55." Id. art. 56.
40. GA. Res. 217, U.N. Doe. A/64/948 (1948). The importance of the Univer-
sal Declaration can hardly be overstated. It has been incorporated into the con-
stitutions of eighteen countries and the domestic law of many more. Filartiga
v. Pena-frala, 630 F.2d 876, 882 n.10 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing 48 REVuE INTERmATo-
NALE DE DRorr PENAL Nos. 3 & 4, at 211 (1977)). See also Ackerman, Torture and
Other Forms of Cruel and Unusual Punishment in International Law, 11 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 653, 667 (1978).
41. "No one shall be subjected to torture, cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment." Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 5, GA.
Res. 217, 3 GAOR (A/810) 73, U.N. Doc. A/64/948 (1948). Cf. Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights art. 7, GA. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 49,
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (similar language).
42. Perhaps the strongest indication of this endorsement rests with the
prohibition against torture. Ackerman's research found prohibitions against
torture or other physical mistreatment in the laws of 112 nations out of 136
countries surveyed. Ackerman, supra note 40, at 667-68.
43. Saario & Cass, supra note 37, at 596-97.
44. GA. Res. 3452, 30 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 34) 91, U.N. Doc. A/1034
(1975).
45. Id. art. 1.
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lates the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.46 The Decla-
ration Against Torture made the prohibition of torture a duty
which may not be derogated, preventing states from justifying
torture because of exceptional circumstances, such as war.47
Domestic courts have been slow to accept the develop-
ments in international law that recognize individual rights.48
Although domestic courts have acknowledged that an alien
may have rights against a foreign state, recent cases have ap-
plied the traditional view that individual rights under interna-
tional law do not extend to situations involving a citizen against
the citizen's own state.49 Possible reasons for the slow adjust-
ment in domestic judicial attitudes toward this shift in interna-
tional law are a respect for domestic sovereignty50 and a
concern about judicial interference with foreign policy.51
Against this background of human rights developments in
international law, the Second Circuit addressed the jurisdic-
tional question in Filartiga. The determinative issue for the Fi-
lartiga court was whether international law supplies a
standard permitting federal jurisdiction over the claim for
wrongful death caused by torture. The court found that the
United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, and the Declaration Against Torture provide a standard
of customary international law forbidding the use of torture.52
Noting that this rule of customary international law does not
distinguish between aliens and citizens, the court found that all
individuals have the right to be free from torture.53 Because
the alienage and tort only requirements were not in dispute,
the finding of a violation of customary international law meant
that the Filartigas' claim satisfied the jurisdictional require-
ments of section 1350.
The Filartiga court showed a sensitivity to recent human
rights developments in international law. In part, the court
could not have avoided the international law issue, given the
egregiousness of the wrong alleged by the Filartigas and the
46. Id. art. 2. See generally GA. Res. 217, 3 GAOR (A/810) 73, U.N. Doc.
A/64/948 (1948).
47. GA. Res. 3452, art. 3, 30 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 34) 91, U.N. Doc. A/1034
(1975).
48. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 442 (1964)
(White, J., dissenting); Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 31 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 429 U.S. 835 (1976); IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (1975).
49. See cases cited in note 48 supra.
50. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964).
51. See id. at 427-33.
52. 630 F.2d at 883-84.
53. Id. at 885.
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universal condemnation of torture by the international commu-
nity. Nevertheless, the analytical process used by the Filartiga
court, which relied extensively on United Nations documents to
prove a new rule of international law, gives new meaning to the
obligations assumed by nations under the human rights provi-
sions of the United Nations Charter.
The court's analytical process was consistent with the
methodology of prior case law because it relied upon diverse
sources, including scholarly authority, current national prac-
tices, and the declarations of nations in United Nations docu-
ments and other international treaties. The court made
extensive use of the United Nations Declaration Against Tor-
ture5 4 and noted that this action was a formal declaration, not
simply a resolution of the General Assembly. To the Filartiga
court this meant not only that the Declaration Against Torture
represented the consensus of the international community,55
but also that the document was an authoritative statement of
the legal commitments assumed by countries ratifying the
United Nations Charter.56 Moreover, by giving specific defini-
tion to one of the rights enunciated in both the Charter and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Declaration
Against Torture removed a major obstacle to finding in the
Charter a binding commitment of nations against torture.57
Once the commitment against torture had risen to the stature
of a rule of customary international law, nations could not uni-
laterally claim that they were not bound thereby.58
54. The Second Circuit reprinted the full text of the Declaration Against
Torture in its opinion. Id. at 882-83.
55. Id. at 884. The court contrasted what it called a "clear consensus" on
the issue of torture with the problem faced by the United States Supreme
Court in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). In Sabba-
tino, the plaintiff had brought an action to recover the proceeds derived from
the sale of sugar that were paid to Cuba after the Cuban government had na-
tionalized the sugar industry. Although the Supreme Court dismissed the suit
on the grounds that it was barred by the act of state doctrine, the Court also
discussed the lack of consensus governing nationalization of foreign-owned as-
sets. Id. at 427-39. The Second Circuit's reference to Sabbatino is confusing,
since Sabbatino ultimately rested on the application of the act of state doctrine
and was not decided as a question of international law.
56. 630 F.2d at 883. Declarations are viewed as "formal and solemn instru-
ment[s], suitable for rare occasions when principles of great and lasting inpor-
tance are being enunciated." Memorandum of the Office of Legal Affairs, U.N.
Secretariat, 34 U.N. ESCOR, Supp. (No. 8) 15, U.N. Doc. E/cn4/1/610 (1962),
quoted in 630 F.2d at 883.
57. See generally Schachter, The Charter and the Constitution: The Human
Rights Provisions in American Law, 4 VA.D. L. REv. 643, 646 (1951); Note, Self-
Executing Treaties and the Human Rights Provisions of the United Nations
Charter: A Separation of Powers Problem, 25 BuFFAwO L REv. 773, 780 (1976).
58. See generally I. OPPENHEIM, supra note 31, § 340e at 740-42. Some have
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The unanimity of international opinion against torture re-
futes any argument that insufficient time had passed since the
adoption of the United Nations Charter and the Declaration
Against Torture to justify the Filartiga court's finding of an ap-
plicable rule of customary international law. In The Paquete
Habana, the Supreme Court applied a standard of interna-
tional law established over several centuries.5 9 Because the
work of the United Nations is of comparatively recent origin,
however, long-established customs do not exist to indicate na-
tional perceptions of commitments under the Charter and to
demonstrate the restrictions on, and modifications of, practices
as a result of these commitments. 60 If the test of time is
needed to create a rule of customary international law, then it
might be argued that the finding of the Filartiga court was
premature.
The Paquete Habana, however, did not set a time require-
ment for determining a rule of customary international law.
The essential requirement for making this determination is
that a consensus exists that the expected and preferred behav-
ior of nations has the force of law.61 Customary international
law is the product of an evolutionary process; heightened con-
tacts and improved communications today may allow such a
argued that there is no norm of international law applicable to torture because
of the widespread use of torture by many nations. Comment, 28 U.S.C. 1350: A
Legal Remedyfor Torture in Paraguay?, 69 GEO. L REV. 833, 846 (1981). Under
this view a rule of customary international law could not have arisen, because
the flouting of the potential rule militates against the establishment of a con-
sensus that torture is forbidden by international law. The Second Circuit re-
jected this view and stated that the mere fact a rule is honored only in the
breach does not mean it lacks the force of law. 630 F.2d at 884 n.15. See The
Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 689-95 (1900) (practice of exempting fishing ves-
sels from wartime seizure not regularly adhered to by several countries). Am-
ple support for the Second Circuit's position is also found in the State
Department's amicus brief which states that "it has been the Department of
State's general experience that no government has asserted a right to torture
its own nationals." Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 16
n.34, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). See note 81 infra and
accompanying text. See also Akehurst, Custom as a Source of International
Law, 1974-75 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 3. A norm's force as law stems not from the
existence of outside sanctions, but from the acceptance by the community of
nations that the rule is one that ought to be observed. As Hersch Lauterpacht
wrote, '"he legal quality of a rule is not dependent upon its observance, or en-
forcement, in any particular case. Unlike a physical law, which would cease to
be valid if it could conclusively be shown to have been contradicted even by a
single event, a legal rule survives individual or repeated breaches of the law."
H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 31, at 20. See also Akehurst, supra at 20.
59. 176 U.S. at 686-713.
60. See generally Bleicher, The Legal Significance of Re-Citation of Gen-
eral Assembly Resolutions, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 444, 449-51 (1969).
61. See Raman, supra note 22, at 367.
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consensus to evolve more rapidly.62 Thus, the widespread
adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
reaffirmation of the specific duty to end torture contained in the
Declaration Against Torture quickly created the necessary con-
sensus that the use of torture violates international law.
The Filartiga court also rejected the argument that the act
of state doctrine posed an obstacle to its jurisdiction.63 The act
of state doctrine, which has its origins in the separation of pow-
ers doctrine, seeks to prevent the judiciary from interfering
with the conduct of American foreign policy.64 Although criti-
cized for unnecessarily circumscribing a court's ability to hear
legitimate claims, the doctrine precludes United States courts
from reviewing the propriety of official acts of foreign govern-
ments taken for a public purpose within the foreign country.65
While the rule has been narrowly construed, it remains as a
limit to the exercise of a court's power.66
Although officially dismissing this defense because it had
not been raised at the district court level, the court stated in
strong language that because Pena's actions violated
Paraguayan as well as international law,67 his conduct did not
have the attributes of an official act sufficient to claim protec-
tion under the act of state doctrine.68 The failure of the
Paraguayan government to protest the bringing of the suit in
the United States further attested to the absence of a public
purpose behind Pena's conduct.69 More importantly, because
Paraguay's obligations under international law to prevent tor-
ture may not be derogated,70 the act of state defense should not
62. See H. LAUTERPACET, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL
CommuNrrY 54 (1933); W. LEvI, CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: A CONCISE
INTRODUCTION 38.41 (1979); Raman, supra note 22, at 387.
63. 630 F.2d at 889.
64. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427-28 (1964). Given
the constitutional dimensions of Sabbatino, the act of state doctrine applied
only to public acts taken for a public purpose within a country. Id.
65. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 706 (1975).
66. See Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, § 301(d), 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2)
(1976); Conant, The Act of State Doctrine and Its Exceptions: An Introduction,
12 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 259, 267 (1979); Comment, The Act of State-Doctrine:
A History of Judicial Limitations and Exceptions, 18 HARv. INr'L. L.J. 677, 688-
91 (1978).
67. 630 F.2d at 889. See Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from
Being Subjected to Torture [hereinafter cited as Declaration Against Torture]
G.. Res. 3452, art. 3, 30 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 34) 91, U.N. Doc. A/1034 (1975).
68. 630 F.2d at 889.
69. Id. Cf. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
1001 (1975) (absent protest from foreign governments in question, petitioner
has no grounds to protest his abduction as a violation of international law).
70. See text accompanying notes 44-47 supra. See also International Cove-
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be available. Because the State Department's brief allayed the
foreign policy concerns implicit in the act of state doctrine,
United States courts will have no reason to apply the doctrine
in future cases involving a Filartiga-type situation.1
Instead of finding an applicable rule of customary law, the
Filartiga court could have found a rule proscribing torture
based on international treaty law. Treaty law may create
norms because nations agree to be bound to the terms of the
treaty.72 Treaty standards may codify existing customary inter-
national law, 73 or lead to the creation of new customary inter-
national law.74 Even if a treaty is not universally ratified,
nant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 4.2, G.A. Res. 2200B, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp.
(No. 16) 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (no derogation of certain basic obligations,
including the obligation not to use torture, even during time of public
emergency).
71. Even though not expressly ruled upon, the Second Circuit's apparent
rejection of the act of state defense is fundamentally important. First, it helps
to define the factual circumstances under which that claim may legitimately be
asserted. Further, the existence of a clear mandatory duty under international
law to ban torture may forestall future resort to the defense if United States
foreign policy changes. Had the Paraguayan government protested the suit, a
more conservative United States administration might have been reluctant to
see the case decided in a United States judicial forum. Unlike the question
presented in Sabbatino, where aliens' property rights under international law
were at issue, the norm pertaining to torture is unambiguous. The existence of
this clear rule will undermine any contention by the State Department in a fu-
ture case that foreign policy considerations require a United States court to re-
frain from hearing the case. Moreover, the Second Circuit decision supports
the viability of international law in protecting individual rights, not only in the
United States, but also within the international community. See generally Lil-
lich, The Proper Role of Domestic Courts in the International Legal Order, 11
VA. J. INT'L L. 9, 22-28 (1970).
The discussion of the act of state issue should not be confused, however,
with a claim of diplomatic immunity, which is recognized in international law
as well as domestic law. 22 U.S.C. § 254a-254c (1976); see Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations, April 18, 1961,23 U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S.
95. Diplomatic immunity operates for the convenience of high-ranking officials
and promotes the free conduct of foreign relations. It would admittedly be un-
fair to deny relief in an action under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350
(1976), because of a claim of diplomatic immunity. The very definition of tor-
ture-by or at the instigation of a public official-suggests a diplomatic immu-
nity claim might be more frequent than a claim of immunity for an act of state.
It is ultimately a balancing of interests that protects individuals claiming diplo-
matic immunity.
72. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 26, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 (1971). See also U.N. CHARTER, STAT. OF LC.J. art. 36, para.
2a; Aldrich, Establishing Legal Norms Through Multilateral Negotiations-The
Laws of War, 11 INT'L LAw 107 (1977).
73. See U.N. CHARTxR art. 13, para. la.
74. See Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom v. Iceland), LC.J. Re-
port 3 (1974); Military Prosecutor v. Kassem, File no. 4/69 (Israeli Military Tri-
bunal Apr. 13, 1969), reprinted in J. Van Dyke, Modern International Law 4-41,
4-42 (1979) (unpublished casebook in University of Hawaii School of Law IA-
brary); THE INTmRNATioNAL MrrArY TRIBUNAL rN SESSION AT NUREMBURG, GER-
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widespread adherence to treaty-based rules, as if they were
binding as law, may result in a rule of customary international
law applicable to all nations. Paraguay could be bound, there-
fore, to proscribe the use of torture even if it had not signed
one of the relevant human rights treaties.75 Greater reliance on
international treaties, however, might have forced the court to
address directly the issue of whether the treaties provide a pri-
vate right of action. Finding an intent to permit this right is dif-
ficult, given the weak provisions for private actions in those
treaties. 76
Although the court avoided the question of a violation of a
United States treaty, the functional result of the decision may
be a limited endorsement of the position that such a treaty was
violated.77 The court's finding that customary international law
mANY, THE TRIAL OF GERMAN MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS 442-43 (1945); J. Van Dyke,
The Laws of War, THE CENTER MAGAZINE 21 (July/Aug. 1971).
75. See generally sources cited in note 74supra; Shimoda v. State, 32 I.R.
626 (D. Ct. of Tokyo, Japan 1965).
76. E.g., American Convention on Human Rights, art. 5, OAS Off. Rec.
OEA/Ser.K/XVI/1, at 1, Doc. 65, Rev. 1, Corr. 2 (1970), reprinted in 9 INT'L LE-
GAL MATERIALS 673 (1970); Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Sept. 3, 1953, art. 3, 213 U.N.T.S. 211 (1968); Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, GA. Res. 2200B, art. 2, 21 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 16), 52 U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966). See Buergenthal, The Ameri-
can Convention on Human Rights: Illusions and Hopes, 28 BuALo L REV.
121, 131-34 (1971); Humphrey, The International Bill of Rights: Scope and Im-
plementation, 17 WM. & MARY L. REV. 527, 540-41 (1976).
Separate documents have been drafted to implement a procedural appara-
tus for individuals to use to protect human rights. These documents would
have been evidence that the requisite treaties covering torture were not in-
tended to give a private right of action. See Optional Protocol to the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, GA Res. 2200C, 21 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. (No. 16) 49, 59, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976);
OAS Off. Rec. AG/Res. 448 (IX-O/79) (1979), reprinted in 19 INr'L LEGAL
MATERiALS 634 (1980) (resolution creating Inter-American Court of Human
Rights). See generally Schwelb, Civil and Political Rights: The International
Measures of Implementation, 62 Am. J. INT'L L 827 (1968).
77. Although the appellants based their case on a violation of customary
international law, amicus petitioner Amnesty International-USA presented the
issue of whether a treaty of the United States provided a basis for jurisdiction
under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1976). Amnesty International-
USA argued that the United Nations Charter, as a treaty of the United States,
had been violated because the later declarations of the United Nations on the
issue of human rights had sufficiently defined United States and Paraguayan
obligations under the Charter to make the Filartigas' claim arise under that
treaty. Brief for Amnesty International-USA as amicus curiae at 7-8, Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). Additionally, the amicus petitioner ar-
gued that article 55 of the Charter compelled jurisdiction based on a violation
of a United States treaty. Id. at 9. The court did not specifically discuss this
jurisdictional argument and only mentioned it in a footnote. 630 F.2d at 880 n.6.
The court partially justified its rejection of this issue on the grounds that
the appellants did not raise the argument. Id. Given precedents holding that
United Nations Charter provisions on human rights are non-self-executing, the
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has made the prohibition against torture obligatory is, in effect,
a ruling that the Charter provisions, insofar as they incorporate
this particular right, are part of domestic law. While Congress
can take direct action to make Charter obligations domestic
law, it is apparent from Filartiga that the development of cus-
tomary international law can achieve the same result in domes-
tic courts, even if the result is only incremental in scope.78
The Second Circuit's willingness to confront the interna-
tional law issues in Filartiga is a marked departure from the
passive role United States courts have recently played in inter-
preting international law.79 The fear of interfering with foreign
affairs, a belief in the primacy of domestic law, and a general
lack of familiarity with relevant international rules among prac-
titioners and the judiciary are perhaps the most important rea-
sons for this passive approach.80 The concern over interfering
with foreign policy in the Filartiga case, however, was mini-
mized by the position taken by the Department of State, partic-
ipating in the case at the request of the Second Circuit.81 The
State Department took a strong stand in favor of the appel-
lants, observing that "where reports of such torture elicit some
credence, a state usually responds by a denial or, less fre-
quently, by asserting that the conduct was unauthorized or
constituted rough treatment short of torture."82 It can be in-
ferred that the State Department's brief was instrumental in
the Filartiga decision, not only because the Department of
State infrequently participates in private litigation, but also be-
court may have felt safer basing its holding on customary international law.
See note 20 supra. The Filartiga court did note, however, that the broad man-
date of the United Nations Charter to support human rights had not been
found to be wholly self-executing, suggesting that the dictum of Sei Fujii v.
State, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952), went too far. See 630 F.2d at 881-82;
note 20 supra.
78. As standards become part of customary international law they also be-
come part of the federal common law, since international law is part of the law
of the United States. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). See also
Dickinson, supra note 12.
79. See Falk, Toward a Theory of Participation of Domestic Courts in the
International Legal Order: A Critique of Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,
16 RUTGERS LJ. 1, 11 (1961); Lillich, supra note 71, at 22-28; Note, Individual En-
forcement of Obligations Arising Under the United Nations Charter, supra note
15, at 195.
80. See Falk, supra note 79; Note, The Relationship Between Executive and
Judiciary: The State Department as the Supreme Court of International Law,
53 MmN. L. REv. 389, 391 (1968).
81. Letter from A. Daniel Fusaro, clerk to the Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit, to Roberts Owen, legal advisor at the Department of State (Oct. 29,
1979).
82. Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
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cause the brief contained a major statement of United States
foreign policy.83
The finding of a prohibition against torture within interna-
tional law was the first significant holding of the Filartiga
court; its ruling was even more important, however, because it
also recognized that individuals have rights under international
law, even against their own states.8 4 The customary interna-
tional law rule recognized by the Filartiga court simply made
no distinction between the citizens of the responsible state and
aliens.8 5 The failure of the rule against torture to distinguish
between aliens and citizens compelled the Second Circuit to
overrule the dictum of its earlier decision that "violations of in-
ternational law do not occur when the aggrieved parties are na-
tionals of the acting state."86 Characterizing that statement as
83. See generally, Lillich, supra note 71; Note, supra note 80.
84. The fundamental importance of this finding is apparent when viewed
against the historical development of international law pertaining to human
rights, especially the work of the United Nations. Although some authorities
have argued that the initial work of the United Natigns in this area, especially
the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, created no binding
obligations on countries, see, e.g., D. GREIG, supra note 33, at 799; H. KELSEN,
THE LAW OF THE UNrrED NATIONS 29-32 (1950); Hudson, Integrity of Interna-
tional Instruments, 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 105, 108 (1948), the weight of scholarly au-
thority today is that the United Nations activity, recognizing the importance of
the individual and clarifying particular rights, has given the individual new sta-
tus under international law. See P. JEssUP, A MODERN LAw OF NATIONs 87-93
(1948); H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 145-54 (1950);
Saario & Cass, supra note 37, at 596. See also Note, supra note 34, at 675.
The effort to give greater substance to these human rights principles sup-
ports this position. The United Nations has produced two important covenants
on human rights: the Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, and
the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. GA. Res. 2200A & 2200B, 21 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 49, 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966). Passed by a resolution of
the General Assembly in 1966, the covenants became effective in 1976 when 35
countries ratified them. Over 60 countries have ratified both covenants, al-
though the United States has failed to do so. See generally Saario & Cass,
supra note 37, at 597-98, Weissbrodt, United States Ratification of the Human
Rights Covenants, 63 MIN. L. REV. 35, 35 nn.1 & 2 (1978). These covenants bind
ratifying nations to implement and support a broad range of individual polit-
ical, social, and economic rights. Id. at 35-36. These statements of rights en-
dorsed by the Charter may gain more authority as more countries sign the
Optional Protocol, which established the Human Rights Committee as an inter-
national tribunal for the protection of human rights. See note 76 supra. See
also note 102 infra.
Given those developments, the unnecessary dicta of Dreyfus v. Von Finck,
534 F.2d 24, 31 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835 (1976), and IIT v. Vencap, Ltd.,
519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (1975), that individuals have no rights in international law
was simply wrong. See notes 48-49 supra and accompanying text. In this re-
spect the Filartiga decision makes United States case law consistent with in-
ternational law. See Humphrey, supra note 76, at 529.
85. See 630 F.2d at 884.
86. Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 31 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835
(1976).
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inconsistent with the current usage and practice of interna-
tional law,87 the court found that the prohibition against torture
fit within a broader definition of international law, as rules or
customs affecting the relationships between states and used by
those states for their common good or dealings with each
other.88 The Filartiga court said this broader definition, bor-
rowed from an earlier district court ruling,89 was adequate as
long as nations do not limit their interpretation of the scope of
international law issues.90
By uncritically adopting this definition of international law
established in a lower court decision, however, the Filartiga
court missed an important opportunity to strengthen its hold-
ing that international law now encompasses individual human
rights, in addition to the prohibition against torture. If the Sec-
ond Circuit was seeking to base its decision on domestic case
law, it could have more aptly chosen The Paquete Habana for
that purpose. Although the methodology used in The Paquete
Habana to find customary international law is often cited, the
case is also recognized as precedent for the principle that indi-
viduals have rights under international law.91 By establishing a
new definition of international law that incorporated recent
changes in that law, the Second Circuit would have given more
effective guidance to courts in handling future human rights
disputes.
Although the Filartiga court found the prohibition against
torture clearly expressed in the United Nations documents,
courts may experience difficulty in applying the prohibition to
particular fact situations. The Declaration Against Torture de-
fines "torture" as the intentional infliction of severe mental or
physical pain to extract information or to punish individuals.92
The Declaration additionally describes torture as "an aggra-
vated and deliberate form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treat-
87. 630 F.2d at 884.
88. Id. at 889.
89. The definition came originally from Lopes v. Reederei Richard Schro-
der, 225 F. Supp. 292 (E.J. Pa. 1963), an action under the Alien Tort Statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1350 (1976), involving an alien's suit for damages resulting from a ship-
owner's negligence and his breach of a duty to keep a vessel seaworthy. The
suit was dismissed for failure to show a relevant rule of international law. 225
F. Supp. at 297.
90. 630 F.2d at 888.
91. 175 U.S. 677, 714 (1900) (the individual bringing the action received re-
dress under international law).
92. Declaration Against Torture, GA. Res. 3452, art. 1, § 1, 30 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. (No. 34) 91, U.N. Doc. A/1034 (1975).
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ment or punishment."93 The qualifying word "aggravated"
suggests the classical concept of torture-the rack and hot iron
of the Inquisition and the modern use of electrical shock and
weighted rubber hose. Other conduct, such as mental abuse,
has the same result as torture, but is difficult to identify and to
classify as torture, because it does not necessarily fit the classi-
cal definition. 94
The need to determine whether a particular act is torture
might not arise if the basic right to be free from torture is part
of a broader right to be free from mistreatment. The sources
used by the Filartiga court to find the customary international
law rule prohibiting torture refer not only to torture, but also to
other forms of "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or pun-
ishment."9 5 Moreover, these other forms of mistreatment are
also regarded as repugnant violations of human rights and fun-
damental freedoms.96 The references to other forms of mis-
treatment in international documents, which unambiguously
establish an international prohibition against torture, indicate
that the concerns of the international community over mis-
treatment are broader than torture.97
93. Id. § 2.
94. United States prisoners of war during the Korean conflict experienced
a variety of ill treatment designed to make soldiers completely dependent and
compliant, without necessarily fitting the classical definition of torture.
The difficulty of classifying certain conduct as torture may also arise in
political contexts. As a result of the internal unrest in Northern Ireland, Brit-
ain was accused of using degrading and physically debilitating treatment on
prisoners held in confinement. The investigation by the European Court on
Human Rights cleared Britain of any charges of torture, although the practices
were criticized. Ireland v. the United Kingdom, [1978] Y.B. EuR. CoNY. ON
HuMAN RIGHTS 602 (Eur. Comm. on Human Rights). See Note, Torture in the
International Community-Problems of Definition and Limitation-The Case of
Northern Ireland, 11 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 159 (1979).
95. Declaration Against Torture, GA. Res. 3452, art. 2,30 U.N. GAOR, Supp.
(No. 34) 91, U.N. Doc. A/1034 (1975). See also sources cited in note 41 supra.
96. Declaration Against Torture, GA. Res. 3452, art. 2,30 U.N. GAOR, Supp.
(No. 34) 91, U.N. Doc. A/1034 (1975). One arguably distinguishing characteristic
of torture which would place it in a class separate from other forms of mistreat-
ment is its use in a political context to subjugate and control persons or groups.
See id. art. 1; AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, REPORT ON TORTURE 10 (1973); Note,
supra note 94, at 159-60. Torture is also unique in some sense because of its
aggravated nature, and because governments do not assert a right to torture
their own citizens. See text accompanying note 93 supra. Although different
only in degree from other forms of mistreatment, this very difference might
have been essential to formation of the consensus needed by the Filartiga
court to make the rule against torture part of customary international law.
97. But differences in available resources and social mores concerning
punishment, rehabilitation, and treatment, especially with nonpolitical prison-
ers or the mentally-ill, may make it more difficult for customary international
law to encompass an expanded right to be generally free from mistreatment.
See, e.g., sources cited in note 41 supra.
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Even if it is limited to the issue of torture, the Filartiga de-
cision is fundamentally important for demonstrating how indi-
vidual human rights can become part of international law. The
court's innovative reliance on United Nations documents will
provide an example for other courts in the use of this relatively
unfamiliar area of law as a new source of individual rights.9 8
The court's limited rejection of the view that the human rights
provisions of the United Nations Charter are not part of domes-
tic law, however, could have important implications for the fur-
ther assertion of human rights in domestic courts, based on the
United Nations Charter or other well-defined actions of the in-
ternational community.99 This may be especially vital if the
Senate fails to ratify the Human Rights Covenants signed by
President Carter in 1977.100
98. See also, Lillich, The Role of Domestic Courts in Promoting Interna-
tional Human Rights Norms, 24 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 153, 177 (1978). The deci-
sion in Filartiga, while specifically addressing the Alien Tort Statute, also adds
another dimension to the concept of standing developed in two recent cases.
See Diggs v. Shultz, 470 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931
(1973); People of Saipan v. United States Dep't of Interior, 502 F.2d 90 (9th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1003 (1975). Infringement of a potential right suffi-
cient to establish standing does not mean, however, that a cause of action can
be' sustained under federal jurisdictional statutes. The particular right being
asserted under article 55 of the United Nations Charter must be sufficiently de-
fined to be part of international law, or otherwise incorporated into domestic
law. See notes 77-78 supra and accompanying text. See generally Garvey, Re-
pression of the Political Emigre-The Underground to International Law: A
Proposal for Remedy, 90 YAL.E L.J. 78, 95-110 (1980).
99. The ramifications of the Filartiga decision could extend to Americans
involved in merchandising the instruments of torture or actually participating
in interrogations using torture. See generally United States v. Toscanino, 500
F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974), in which the petitioner alleged United States law en-
forcement officials were present when Brazilian officials tortured him before
sending him back to the United States to face drug charges.
The Filartiga decision may also present a new way of looking at prisoners'
rights cases generally. The eighth amendment proscription against "cruel and
unusual punishment," U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII, has been used to force several
states to bring prison conditions up to an acceptable minimum standard. E.g.,
Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978); Battle v. Anderson, 564 F.2d 388 (10th Cir.
1977); Adams v. Mathis, 458 F. Supp. 302 (M.D. Ala.), affid 614 F.2d 42 (5th Cir.
1978). As the meaning of the international right to be free from cruel, inhuman,
or degrading treatment gains added application, it might be an alternative
ground for establishing the rights of prisoners. See Fernandez v. Wilkinson,
No. 81-1238, slip op. at 13 (10th Cir. July 9, 1981); Lareau v. Manson, 507 F. Supp.
1177, 1185 (D. Conn. 1980). International standards may also define available
rights to persons confined involuntarily in mental institutions. See Kaimowitz
v. Michigan Dep't of Mental Health, No. 73-19434-AW, slip op. at 23-25 (Wayne
County [Mich.] Cir. Ct. July 10, 1973); ef. United States v. Solomon, 563 F.2d
1121 (4th Cir. 1977) (eighth amendment protection extends to the institution-
ally-confined mentally retarded).
100. See generally Weissbrodt, supra note 84. The lack of Senate approval
does not totally end United States obligations to support the rights endorsed in
the covenants. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969,
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Unfortunately, the decision of the Second Circuit may
eventually provide the Filartigas with only limited or no relief.
Without the presence of the defendant, the plaintiffs are denied
a forum in which to litigate their claim. Assuming a forum is
available and the plaintiffs' claim succeeds, even a simple
money judgment may be uncollectible, thus illustrating the dif-
ficulties and limitations of enforcing emerging international lib-
erties.' 0 ' The prescriptive force of international law may
eventually compel nations to improve treatment of their citi-
zens, but until that time only limited opportunities to gain re-
lief will be available. 0 2
The ruling in Filartiga suggests that United States courts
may be more willing to assume jurisdiction in cases involving
international claims alleging a violation of human rights. Even
if these cases are confined to narrow circumstances, future ac-
tions in United States courts will further the development of
new standards for the international law of human rights. This
effort should be supported. The fact-finding process and public
record established in this country may aid other judicial fo-
rums in implementing human rights and in protecting these
rules from political interference.
art. 18, U.N. Doc. A/CONF 39/27 (1971); 14 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNA-
rIONAL LAw 328-330 (1970).
101. But see Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1980), in
which the plaintiff was awarded damages from the Chilean government for a
death resulting from a bombing attack on a former Chilean government official.
102. Enforcement mechanisms do exist to give some degree of protection to
individual rights in international law. The Optional Protocol to the Interna-
tional Covenant on Human Rights establishes the Human Rights Committee,
consisting of 18 members serving in their individual capacity. States that have
signed the Optional Protocol can nominate members to the committee. Individ-
uals from states having ratified the Optional Protocol have the right to petition
the Human Rights Committee to hear their allegations of violations of rights
guaranteed by the Covenant and the Protocol. Optional Protocol to the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, GA. Res. 2200C, 21 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. (No. 16) 49, 59, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
See Schwelb, supra note 76, at 835-38. The Organization of American States ap-
proved the creation of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in October
1979. OAS Off. Rec. AG/Res. 448 (IX-0/79) (1979), reprinted in 19 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 634 (1980). The resolution establishing the court became effective
on January 1, 1980; the organization of the Inter-American Court is similar to
that of the Human Rights Committee.
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